Let’s be honest: no one likes paying taxes. People complain about paying too much, or about other people not paying enough.
But taxation is not a topic worth avoiding. How a country taxes, who it taxes, and why it taxes determines the kind of society it becomes.
And whether any of it works depends on something less discussed than tax policy: the administration that collects it.
The purpose and impact of taxation falls into four categories.
- Generating resources for public services
- Equity and growth, shaping who carries the burden
- Behaviour, influencing what people and businesses do
- The social contract, defining the relationship between citizen and state
A fifth consideration runs underneath all of them, and this article ends there: none of these outcomes are produced by tax law alone. They are produced by tax law that an administration can actually implement.
Taxes generate a country’s resources
The most fundamental purpose of taxation is to raise the resources governments need to deliver public services. Taxes pay for the things functioning societies depend on: health care, schools, courts, roads, and social protection.
There is a widely cited threshold for how much is enough to begin with. IMF research identified a tax-to-GDP tipping point of around 12.75 per cent, above which real GDP per capita increases sharply and in a sustained manner.[1] That finding underpins the 15 per cent benchmark now commonly used as the minimum level at which a state can reliably fund basic functions.
More recent World Bank analysis puts the developmental stakes in concrete terms. Moving from a tax-to-GDP ratio of 7 per cent to 15 per cent is associated with an additional 10 percentage points of cumulative growth over the following decade.[2]
For many countries that gap is not theoretical. In low-income developing countries, tax-to-GDP tends to cluster tightly around 10 per cent.[3] The IMF estimates that a 9 percentage point increase is feasible in developing countries through a combination of tax system reform and institutional capacity building.[3]
That is close to a doubling of domestic revenue, achieved without discovering a new resource or receiving a larger grant.
But revenue raised is only half of the equation. What matters equally is whether citizens can see it converted into services they value.
Research on why the Nordic countries consistently rank among the happiest in the world is often summarised as a link between high taxes and high wellbeing. The more careful reading of that literature is that the relationship runs through institutional quality and satisfaction with public services, not through tax rates themselves.[4] High taxation accompanied by weak service delivery does not produce the same outcome.
The distinction matters for any government considering how to strengthen its revenue position. Raising more is necessary. Being seen to spend it well is what makes raising more sustainable.
"Taxation is more than revenue. It is a tool for development."
Inter-American Development Bank
Equity and Growth
Beyond funding the state, taxation shapes how the burden of funding it is distributed, and that distribution has economic consequences.
Corbacho and colleagues at the Inter-American Development Bank make the case for reforming fiscal systems toward progressive structures that promote growth, mobility, and social equality.[5] Their framing, that taxation is more than revenue, has become one of the standard reference points in development finance.
All governments need revenue. The difficulty lies in choosing not only rate levels but the tax base itself. Participants at the global conference of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax raised the concern that the trend toward lower taxation of capital, intended to encourage growth, makes it harder to counter growing inequality of income and wealth.[6]
Widening income and wealth gaps undermine social cohesion, and eventually undermine growth as well. Distributing the tax burden appropriately, in a way that preserves the income of poorer households, is not only an equity question. It is a stability question.
There is a second design consideration that receives less attention. A tax system can be structured in a way that discourages participation in it.
Rates that are too high, or compliance costs that are too heavy, hold back private sector development and slow the formalisation of businesses. This matters disproportionately for smaller enterprises. They contribute modestly to total tax revenue, but they contribute substantially to growth and employment.
In economies with large informal sectors this becomes the central problem rather than a peripheral one. Where informality is high, the tax base is not simply small. It is structurally difficult to reach, and the cost of complying is one of the reasons.
Behavior
Taxes change what people and businesses do. Governments have long used this deliberately.
Tobacco taxation to reduce consumption and environmental taxes to reduce emissions are the clearest examples. In both cases the revenue is secondary to the behavioural objective, and in some designs falling revenue is the signal of success.
The effect extends further than consumption. Tax design influences whether a household’s second earner enters the labour market, whether a business formalises, whether an individual registers as self-employed, and whether income is reported accurately. Each of those choices has consequences for human development that sit well outside the finance ministry.
Gender is one dimension where this has received sustained policy attention, with tax structures shown to affect labour market participation and household decision-making in ways that are frequently unintended.[7]
The general principle holds across all of these cases. Taxation is never behaviourally neutral. A government that does not consider the behavioural effect of a tax design will still produce one.
The Social Contract
The final purpose is the least tangible and the most consequential. Taxation is a central component of the relationship between citizens and the state.
When citizens regard the tax system as fair, and when they see value in the public services they receive in return, they are more likely to comply. When they do not, compliance becomes something that has to be enforced rather than something that occurs.
This is the mechanism behind tax morale: the extent to which people accept a moral obligation to pay tax as a contribution to society. It is not a soft concept. It is the thing that determines how much revenue arrives without enforcement action, which in every measured system is the overwhelming majority of it.
The evidence on what drives it is consistent. Research on informality in the Caribbean identified concrete barriers to registration that have nothing to do with willingness: the cost of formalising, lack of information about how to register, official language that operators found difficult to follow, and the perceived attitude of state representatives.[8] Work examining social security compliance decisions in Anguilla found significant relationships between compliance and perceptions of good governance.[9]
Read together, that evidence points somewhere specific. Trust is built or eroded through ordinary administrative encounters. Not through communications campaigns, but through whether registering is straightforward, whether a query receives an answer, whether a dispute is resolved, and whether the rules are applied to everyone in the same way.
Why administration determines whether any of this works
The four purposes above are all functions of tax policy. None of them are delivered by policy alone.
A tax that is legislated but not collected raises no resources. A progressive rate structure applied to a base that excludes half the economy does not produce equity. A behavioural tax that can be avoided changes no behaviour. And a system that treats taxpayers inconsistently erodes the social contract regardless of how fair the underlying law is.
The institutions that carry this are substantial. Across the jurisdictions in the OECD’s comparative series, tax administrations collect on average 63 per cent of all government revenue, amounting to around 22 per cent of GDP.[10]
The gap between what tax systems should collect and what they do collect is measurable, and it is largest where administrative capacity is weakest.
Across Latin America and the Caribbean, more revenue is lost to non-compliance than to the exemptions and reduced rates parliaments deliberately wrote into law. In small administrations, where a single institution may operate with fewer than a hundred staff across every tax and every function, that gap widens further.
None of that is a policy failure. It is a capacity constraint, and unlike a policy choice it can be addressed without legislation.

That is why tax matters
Those four outcomes are why tax policy receives the attention it does. They are also why the arguments about it are rarely only technical. A decision about who pays and how much is a decision about what kind of society a country is building.
What follows from that is a responsibility on both sides. Citizens and businesses meet their obligations. Government converts what it collects into services people can see and use, and administers the system in a way that makes complying reasonable rather than burdensome.
Where that reciprocity holds, taxation stops being something merely endured and becomes what it was intended to be: the mechanism by which a society funds the things none of us could fund alone.
Common questions about taxation and tax administration:
Taxation serves four purposes: it generates the resources governments need to fund public services, it shapes how the cost of the state is distributed across society, it influences the behaviour of people and businesses, and it forms a central part of the social contract between citizens and government. How a country taxes affects not only what it can afford but what kind of society it becomes.
IMF research identified a tipping point of around 12.75 per cent of GDP, above which real GDP per capita increases sharply and in a sustained way. A benchmark of 15 per cent is commonly used as the minimum level at which a state can reliably fund basic functions. In low-income developing countries, tax-to-GDP typically clusters around 10 per cent.
Through several channels. Adequate revenue funds the infrastructure, education, and institutions that growth depends on, and World Bank analysis associates moving from 7 per cent to 15 per cent of GDP with an additional 10 percentage points of cumulative growth over a decade. Tax design also affects growth directly, since rates and compliance costs that are too high can discourage private sector development and slow the formalisation of small businesses.
It refers to the reciprocal relationship in which citizens contribute revenue and government delivers public services and accountable governance. Where citizens judge the system to be fair and see value in what they receive, compliance tends to be voluntary. Where that judgement turns negative, compliance has to be enforced, which is more expensive and less reliable.
Tax morale is the extent to which people accept a moral obligation to pay tax as their contribution to society. It matters because voluntary compliance carries the overwhelming share of revenue in functioning systems.
Research indicates it is shaped by practical administrative factors, including how easy registration is, how clearly obligations are communicated, and whether the administration is perceived as well governed.
Because policy sets intent and administration determines results. A tax that is legislated but not collected raises no revenue, a progressive rate structure applied to a base that excludes much of the economy does not produce equity, and a behavioural tax that can be avoided changes no behaviour. Across the jurisdictions in the OECD’s comparative series, tax administrations collect on average 63 per cent of all government revenue.
Footnotes:
[1] Tax Capacity and Growth: Is there a Tipping Point? — International Monetary Fund
[2] Taxing for Growth: Revisiting the 15 Percent Threshold — World Bank
[3] Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries, Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/006 — International Monetary Fund
[4] The Nordic Exceptionalism: What Explains Why the Nordic Countries Are Constantly Among the Happiest in the World — World Happiness Report
[5] More than Revenue: Taxation as a Development Tool — Inter-American Development Bank
[6] Taxation and the Sustainable Development Goals, Conference Report — Platform for Collaboration on Tax
[7] Gender and Taxation: Why Care About Taxation and Gender Equality? — OECD
[8] Informality in the Caribbean — ILO Decent Work Team and Office for the Caribbean
[9] Determinants of Social Security Compliance in a Small Island Developing State: An Analysis of Anguilla — socialprotection.org
[10] Tax Administration 2025: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies — OECD